5.

Fact that Imperfect Doesn't Mean Either that
1. "Demeanor" Evidence "Demeanor evidence refers to the non-verbal cues given by a witness while testifying, including voice tone, facial expressions, body language, and other cues such as the manner of testifying, and the witnesses's attitude while testifying." Gregory L. Ogden 
Non-Demeanor Factors Relevant to Credibility
Non-demeanor factors relevant to a witness's credibility fall into three categories:
(a) The witness's bad character for truthfulness:
1. The witness's prior convictions;
2. The witness's pertinent prior bad acts, which have not resulted in his or her criminal conviction, but the hearing judge finds relevant to character for truthfulness;
3. The witness's bad reputation for truthfulness, or another witness's bad opinion of the witness's truthfulness;
The witness, even though well-meaning, is mistaken:
4. Bad eyesight, hearing, etc.;
5.
Use of drugs or alcohol at pertinent time (either time of event or when testifying);
6.
Conditions under which witness's observation were made, e.g., poor lighting, witness upset, fearful;
7. Suggestiveness of, e. g., identification procedure; or (c) Either the witness is lying or is mistaken:
8.
Bias that may have affected perception and memory; or bias, interest, prejudice, or improper motive, giving the witness a reason to lie;
9. The witness's prior inconsistent statements, closer to the time of the event, when memory was fresher; or the witness's prior inconsistent statements (showing an inability to "keep his or her story straight");
10.
Contradictory substantive evidence (real or from other witnesses who observed the same event) (this has the secondary effect of also impeaching this witness's testimony) (corroborating evidence would enhance credibility);
11. The plausibility of the facts being as the witness testifies.
See, e.g., Haebe v. Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288 , 1302 n. 30 (Fed. Cir. 2002 ; John L. Kane, Judging Credibility, 33 LITIGATION No.3, 31 (Spring 2007) ; Christopher W. Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of Cognitive Error, 57 STAN. L. REV. 291, 358-59 (2004) (for example, in the prosecution of Martha Stewart, evidence that contradicted her defense included both an entry by her assistant in a computer phone log, that "Peter Bacanovic thinks ImClone is going to start trading downward." and the fact that Bacanovic's worksheet with regard to Stewart's holdings contained no notation of an instruction to sell TmClone if it went below $60/share); James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling) , 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903 (2000) .
Tn a survey of 56 federal judges regarding standards for evaluating credibility, "Clear winners were internal inconsistency and external contradiction. Demeanor fared somewhat less well, with ... most judges rating it somewhat better than middling, tending toward 'one of the better indices' which deserved at least the importance that jurors usually ascribe to it. Character ... was [for most judges] simply 'one of several factors that should be taken into account."').
H. Richard Uviller, Credence, Character, 
and the Rules of Evidence: Seeing Through the Liar's
Tale, 42 DUKE L.J. 776, 825 (1993) .
B.
More Choices than Either "All or Nothing"
Although the maxim "falsus in unius, falsus in omnibus" suggests that one lie or mistaken statement supports rejecting all of that witness's testimony, that is neither required nor does it comport with experience. See, e.g., NLRB v. Regal Knitwear Co., 140 F.2d 746 (2d Cir. 1944 ) (per curiam) ["[C] onfusion as to details is not uncommon in the stories of entirely honest and reliable witnesses. ").
As Md. Pattern Jury Instruction [Civil] I :3, for example, instructs: "You need not believe any witness even though the testimony is uncontradicted. You may believe all, part, or none of the testimony of any witness."
III.
Greater Deference Given to ALJ's Demeanor-Based ("Testimonial Inferences") rather than Other ("Derivative Inferences") Assessments of Credibility
Both administrative agencies receiving "proposed" decisions by ALJ's and courts performing judicial review of agency decisions distinguish between ALl's credibility assessments based on demeanor and those based on non-demeanor factors. Only the ALJ's demeanor-based evaluations (referred to in the literature as "testimonial inferences") are given special deference. The agency need not defer to an ALl's credibility determinations (referred to as "derivative inferences") based on non-demeanor factors.
A. The Importance Historically Accorded to Demeanor Evidence
We have long held fast to the notion that seeing a witness while the witness testifies is of great import in evaluating the witness's credibility. See, e.g., Pharaon v. Board ~fGovernors ~f Fed Reserve Sys., 135 F.3d 148,154 (D.C. Cir. 1998 ) (citing "the significance of personal observation to credibility determinations"); Md. Pattern Jury Instruction [Civil] 1:3 (providing in part: "In determining whether a witness should be believed, you should carefully judge all the testimony and evidence and the circumstances under which each witness has testified. Among the factors that you should consider are the following: (1) the witness' behavior on the stand and way of testifying . ... ").
Demeanor evidence has been accorded crucial importance since early Roman times. E.g., NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487-88 (2d Cir. 1952 Indeed, this value underlies the hearsay rule, a criminal accused's sixth amendment confrontation right, and the element of an opportunity to cross-examine that is generally found to be ensconced in the due process clause. See, e.g., Fed. R. Civ. P. 43(a) (testimony of witnesses shall be given "in open court") & 52 ("due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses"). See generally James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling) , 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903 (2000) ; Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. at 1075 REV. at , 1076 REV. at -77 (1991 .
B. The Inadequacy of a Cold Transcript
Seeing and hearing a witness testify provides "demeanor evidence" which is unfathomable from a stark transcript of the testimony. Consider this example, plucked by Chief ALJ Timony of the FTC from the movie, "My Cousin Vinnie": Tony: Why are you arresting me? Sheriff: Because we think you shot the store clerk. Tony: I shot the store clerk!! Sheriff: You shot the store clerk? Tony: I shot the store clerk!!! Sheriff: I knew you'd confess.
James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling) , 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 903 (2000) . The reader cannot tell: Was Tony confessing or was he instead shocked that he was being accused?
As Judge Jerome Frank explained:
[T]he demeanor of an orally-testifying witness is "always assumed to be in evidence." It is "wordless language." The liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it may be "contradicted" in the trial court by his manner, his intonations, his grimaces, his gestures, and the like-all matters which "cold print does not preserve" and which constitute "lost evidence" so far as an upper court is concerned. For such a court, it has been said, even if it were called a "rehearing court," is not a "reseeing court." Only were we to have "talking movies" of trials could it be otherwise. A "stenographic transcript correct in every detail fails to reproduce tones of voice and hesitations of speech that often make a sentence mean the reverse of what the words signify. The best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor of the fruit before it was dried." It resembles a pressed flower. The witness' demeanor, not apparent in the record, may alone have "impeached" him .... Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949) . Accord, e.g., NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir. 1951 ) (Learned Hand, J.) (on remand). But see Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1075 (1991 (urging civil trials by deposition transcript).
Broadcast
C.
Demeanor Evaluations Are Imperfect at Best
There is no "science" to demeanor evaluations. Like Othello, we may misjudge our fellows' veracity:
The Moor is of a free and open nature, That thinks men honest that but seem to be so; And will as tenderly be led by the nose as asses are.
(Othello, Act 1, Sc. 3, 1. 405-8).
1.
Empirical AU's, 20 J. NAALJ at 1,8, 11 (2000) . Its importance increased when coupled with other non-demeanor credibility factors. Id. at 14. The ALl's also report that, more frequently than they encounter "liars," they see witnesses whose memories are frail. See, e.g., Anderson v. Department of Public Safety & Correctional Servs., 330 Md. 187,201,623 A.2d 198,205 (1993) (AU there found that "The variations in [the] reports resulted from the difference in recollections of the writers rather than any intent to falsify an official report."). REV. 1157 REV. , 1195 REV. (1993 ("Most of the behaviors received through the auditory channel that were associated with perceptions of deception were also observed during actual deception: increases in speech hesitations, speech errors, and in the pitch ofa speaker's voice.") (footnote omitted). This "manner oftestifying (e.g., evasive or direct)" was also rated the most important by the ALJ's in the survey (others, ranked in descending importance, were "witness's attitude" (positive or negative), "body language," "facial expressions," and "voice tone."). Gregory L. 
3.
Cultural Bias
In evaluating demeanor evidence, judges must be sensitive to cultural differences, as well. Some groups, for example, may consider looking one directly in the eye as disrespectful or immodest.
Angry Witnesses
Some empirical evidence suggests that judges may discredit the testimony of a witness who demonstrates anger at the opposing party. A natural tendency to write off the angry person's testimony as exaggerated and vindictive does not take into account that the party's anger may have been a necessary impetus to enable him or her to have the courage to stand up for himself or herself See Laurie S. Kohn Agency decision-makers after an ALJ's proposed decision I do not defer to the ALJ's non-testimonial, non-demeanor assessments of credibility, on the ground that as to these, the ALl has no "advantage in logically evaluating such evidence. " Fuller d/b/a Lewisville Flooring Co., 108 NLRB 1442 , 1444 n.3 (1954 . Accord, e.g, Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049 , 1055 -56 (7th Cir. 1996 Kopack v. NLRB, 668 F.2d 946, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1982); Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 , 1078 -79 (9th Cir. 1977 NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484, 487 (2d Cir. 1952 
):
See American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera, 194 F.2d 449,451 (2d. Cir. 1951) : "We accept, as we must, those of the trial judge's inferences of fact which he drew directly from his estimates of the credibility of witnesses whom he observed as they testified in his presence, i.e., his inferences (sometimes called 'testimonial inferences') that certain facts existed because he believed some witness or witnesses who testified before him that those facts did exist. We are not required, however, to accept a trial judge's findings, based not on facts to which a witness testified orally, but only on secondary or derivative inferences from the facts which the trial judge directly inferred I An ALl's decisions may be either "proposed" or "final" agency decisions. See, e.g, Md. State Gov't Code Ann. § 10-207(a)(1)-(2) (under this Administrative Procedure Act [derived from the 1961 version of the model act] a state agency "may delegate to the [Office of Administrative Hearings] the authority that the agency ... has to hear particular contested cases" and even "the authority to issue the final administrative decision of the agency in a contested case").
from such testimony. We may disregard such a finding of facts thus derivatively inferred, if other rational derivative inferences are open. And we must disregard such a finding when the derivative inference either is not rational or has but a flimsy foundation in the testimony."; Consumer Protection Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 197-201,874 A.2d 919 (2005) App. 283, 641 A.2d 899 (1994) [which also quoted favorably from Penasquitos Village], clearly articulated the distinction. " [W] hen an administrative agency overrules the recommendation of an ALJ, a reviewing court's task is to determine if the agency's final order is based on substantial evidence in the record. In making this judgment, the ALJ's findings are, of course, part of the record and are to be considered along with the other portions of the record. Moreover, where credibility is pivotal to the agency's final order, ALJ's findings based on the demeanor of witnesses are entitled to substantial deference and can be rejected by the agency only if it gives strong reasons for doing so. If, however, after giving appropriate deference to the ALJ's demeanor-based findings there is sufficient evidence in the record to support both the decision of the ALJ and that of the agency, the agency's final order is to be affirmed-even if a court might have reached the opposite conclusion. This approach preserves the rightful roles of the ALJ, the agency, and the reviewing court: it gives special deference to both the ALJ's demeanor-based credibility determinations and to the agency's authority in making other factual findings and properly limits the role of the reviewing court." * * * Consequently, in the instant matter, the Secretary was not restrained by the recommended conclusion drawn by the ALl; rather, the Secretary was free to make the determinative inference, based on the entire record, that the excess costs were unreasonable, if that inference was supported by substantial evidence; Here, the ALl stated several times in her proposed decision that the appellee's expert witnesses were credible, and that they were more credible than the Board's expert witnesses. The reasons she gave to support her credibility findings did not involve demeanor, however. Clearly, the ALJ found the appellee's experts to be more experienced, more proficient, more knowledgeable, and more objective than the Board's witnesses, and determined on those bases that their opinions were sound and correct, and were "'persuasive" and "credible." She said nothing to indicate that the outward appearances of the expert witnesses as they testified played a part in her credibility evaluations of their testimony. By her own account of her evaluation of the evidence, the ALJ did not place any importance upon the demeanor of the expert witnesses in deciding which of them was more credible in their testimony. * * * [T]he Board may make its own decisions about bias, interest, credentials of expert witnesses, the logic and persuasiveness of their testimony, and the weight to be given their opinions. (emphasis added);
State Comm 'n on Human Relations v. Kaydon Ring & Seal, Inc., 149 Md. App. 666, 688-703, 818 A.2d 259, 272-80 (2003) ; Gabaldoni v. Board of Physician Quality Assurance, 141 Md. App. 259, 785 A.2d 771 (2001) .
IV. Standard of Review
Appropriate deference to the hearing judges has desirable results: it makes more probable the finality of their decisions and enhances respect for and confidence in them. See Olin G. Wellborn, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REv. lO75, 1095 REv. lO75, -96 (1991 . When the ALJ's are independent of the agency, its deference to the ALJ greatly increases the public's confidence in the fairness of the process.
In Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 424 (1951) , the United States Supreme Court held that, upon judicial review, an agency's decision must be upheld as long as there is "substantial evidence" to support it in the record. The Court made clear that under both the Administrative Procedure Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, "substantial evidence" may not be shown by looking at the evidence supporting the agency decision in isolation; the record must be evaluated as a whole, and the ALJ's (examiner's) report must be considered as part of that record). Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court, explained:
Id. at 496-97.
We do not require that the examiner's findings be given more weight than in reason and in the light of judicial experience they deserve. The "substantial evidence" standard is not modified in any way when the Board and its examiner disagree. We intend only to recognize that evidence supporting a conclusion may be less substantial when an impartial, experienced examiner who has observed the witnesses and lived with the case has drawn conclusions different from the Board's than when he has reached the same conclusion. The findings of the examiner are to be considered along with the consistency and inherent probability of testimony. The significance of his report, of course, depends largely on the importance of credibility in the particular case. To give it this significance does not seem to us materially more difficult than to heed the other facts which in sum determine whether evidence is "substantial."
On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit said that the NLRB must not reject the findings of an Examiner based directly upon the "bearing and delivery" of witnesses who orally testified before him, absent "a very substantial preponderance in the testimony as recorded. " NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 190 F.2d 429,430 (2d Cir. 1951) . In Dinion Coil, 201 F.2d at 490, one year later, the same court said that it:
"surely may not upset the Board when it accepts a finding of an Examiner which is grounded upon (a) his disbelief in an orally testifying witness' testimony because of the witness' demeanor or (b) the Examiner's evaluation of oral testimony as reliable, unless on its face it is hopelessly incredible -cf GindorfJ v. Prince, 189 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1951) Servs., 330 Md. 187,212, 623 A,2d 198, 210 (1993) , the Court of Appeals of Maryland was mindful of the fact that it '''should [not] substitute its judgment for the expertise of those persons who constitute the administrative agency from which the appeal is taken'" and that "'judicial review essentially should be limited to whether a reasoning mind reasonably could have reached the factual conclusion the agency reached. This need not and must not be either judicial fact-finding or a substitution of judicial judgment for agency judgment. '" The Anderson court distinguished judicial review of administrative action from appellate review of a trial court judgment in another way, as well:
In the latter context the appellate court will search the record for evidence to support the judgment and will sustain the judgment for a reason plainly appearing on the record whether or not the reason was expressly relied upon by the trial court. However, in judicial review of agency action the court may not uphold the agency order unless it is sustainable on the agency's findings and for the reasons stated by the agency.
Id. at 213,623 A,2d at 211.
In Anderson, the Secretary had reached factual findings contrary to the ALl's without readily ascertainable "substantial evidence" to support them. Stressing the significance of the credibility of conflicting witnesses in the case before it, and the fact that " [o] ne of the main objectives of the Legislature in establishing the OAH was to provide an impartial hearing officer [not employed by or under the control of the agency] in contested cases," id. at 213-14,623 A.2d at 211, it concluded that the agency's decision must be reversed and remanded, so that the Secretary could reconsider her order.
We think that the credibility of the witnesses was of the utmost importance in the circumstances here; it played a dominant role; it was pivotaL But there is no indication that the [Secretary] gave any deference to the ALJ's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses before him. And she gave no strong reasons for rejecting the ALJ's assessments of credibility. It seems that the [Secretary] made her own findings of fact, as suggested by the representative of the Penitentiary, and it appears that she did not take into account in making them the factual findings of the AU. Therefore, we believe that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was wrong when it found that there was substantial evidence to support the order of the [Secretary] The Anderson-Shrieves Deference Rule is of limited utility. It is a small wrinkle on the substantial evidence test. It does not apply to an ALl's proposed decisions or conclusions of law. It does not apply to an ALl's proposed findings of fact that are based on derivative inferences. It does not apply even to the assessment of credibility, when the credibility assessment is not primarily demeanor-based but is based on, as is frequently the case with expert witnesses, technical knowledge or specialized practices that implicate the expertise of the reviewing agency. It does not apply even to demeanor-based credibility findings if the reviewing agency has other substantial evidence supporting its decision to disregard the proposed findings of the ALJ. In the limited circumstances in which it does apply, ti still does not necessarily bind the agency. It simply imposes upon the agency the additional burden of articulating a sound reason for not accepting the demeanor-based fact-finding of the ALl.
See also Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 , 1078 -79 (9th Cir. 1977 ) (through the substantial evidence test, "Deference is accorded the Board's factual conclusions for a different reason Board members are presumed to have broad experience and expertise in labormanagement relations. Further, it is the Board to which Congress has delegated administration of the Act. The Board, therefore, is viewed as particularly capable of drawing inferences from the facts of a labor dispute. Accordingly, it has been said that a Court of Appeals must abide by the Board's derivative inferences, if drawn from not discredited testimony, unless those inferences are 'irrational. ''') (citations omitted).
V.
"Make the Record Sing"
The greater the extent to which an ALJ articulates that he or she is basing a credibility determination at least in part on demeanor, the greater the deference that is likely to be given that determination. See Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 227 F.3d 817, 829 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Arguments to the dIect that the ALl should not have found certain witnesses to be credible are, to put it bluntly, almost never worth making.") A.
Rarely, If Ever, Does a Case Hinge on Demeanor Evidence Alone Judge Dunaway, concurring in part and dissenting in part in Penasquitos Village, 565 F.2d at 1086, expressed this opinion:
I doubt if there are many cases in which the fact finder relies on demeanor alone. There may not be any; I hope that there are none. I think that in every case in which he thinks about what he is doing, the fact finder should and does consider both the demeanor of the witness and what he says, the content of his testimony, and weighs those factors in relation to the fact finder's knowledge of life's realities, the internal consistency of what the witness is saying, and its consistency, or lack of it, with the other evidence in the case, testimonial, documentary, and physical. 
B.
Need for Record to Be Explicit
The ALJ Should Articulate His or Her Grounds for Crediting or Discrediting Particular Evidence
If an ALl bases his or her decision on a finding of demeanor-based credibility, the ALl must so state on the record, or the agency and/or the reversing court cannot defer to the ALl E.g., Ceguerra v The district court erred by deferring to the ALl's opportunity to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses. In appropriate cases, administrative law judges may base their conclusion on a determination that witnesses did not testify credibly. They cannot, however, tacitly reject a witness's testimony as not credible. When the decision of an ALJ rests on a negative credibility evaluation, the ALJ must make findings on the record and must support those findings by pointing to substantial evidence on the record. Napoleon Ceguerra was the only witness at the hearing. The ALJ in this case did not find that the testimony lacked credibility. Because the ALJ made no findings to suggest that he did not believe Napoleon Ceguerra, the ALJ's opportunity to observe demeanor provides no grounds for affirming.
Rejection of a witness's positive testimony must be supported by "a 'specific, cogent reason.'" Figeroa v. US INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78-79 (4th Cir. 1989 (2003) (where an ALJ did not make a credibility determination resolving the conflicting testimony in a crucial fact, the agency should remand the matter to the ALJ).
The Difficulty of Analyzing and Recounting Demeanor Evidence and Its Impact
How much should we require ALJ's to put on the record? Can a judge adequately and accurately record and express her evaluations based on demeanor, other than in a most conclusory form? As the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained in Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d at 488, 90, there are no rules to follow but those of experience:
"[M]ethods of evaluating the credibility of oral testimony do not lend themselves to formulations in terms of rules and are thus, inescapably, 'un-ruly.' In his brilliant discussion of evidence, Sir James Stephen illuminated the difficult task of a trial judge who, observing a witness in the brief period when the witness appears in court, tries to ascertain how far the witness' 'powers of observation and memory * * * enable him to tell the truth' and 'how far the innumerable motives, by anyone of which he may be activated, dispose him' to do so. 'No rules of evidence * * * can perceptibly affect this difficulty,' Stephen remarked. 'Judges (i.e., trial judges) must deal with it as well as they can by the use of their natural faculties and acquired experience, and the miscarriages of justice in which they will be involved by reason of it must be set down to the imperfection of our means of arriving at truth. * * * Insofar as [this power of discernment] can be acquired at all, it is to be acquired only by experience, for the acquisition of which the position of a judge is by no means peculiarly favourable. * * * Such observations are seldom, if ever thrown by those who make them into the form of express propositions. Indeed, for obvious reasons, it would be impossible to do so. The most acute observer would never be able to catalogue the tones of voice, the passing shades of expression or the unconscious gestures which he had learnt to associate with falsehood; and if he did, his observations would probably be of little use to others. Every man must learn matters of this sort of himself, and though no sort of knowledge is so important to a judge, no rules can be laid down for its acquisition. * * * No process is gone through, the correctness of which can be independently tested. The judge has nothing to trust but his own nature and acquired sagacity.' Sir Henry Maine agreed with Stephen. He said that there are no 'rules to guide' a "judge of the Fact' in 'drawing inferences from the assertion of a witness to the existence of the facts asserted by him.' * * * [I] t is the rarest and highest personal accomplishment of a judge to make allowance for the ignorance and timidity of witnesses, and to see through the confident and plausible liar. * * * This lack of rules ('unruliness'), with its concomitant wide discretion in the fact-trier, yields inherent difficulties not surmountable by a reviewing court, regardless of whether the fact-trier by a judge, a jury, or a trial exammer.
Damned If You Don't and Damned If You Do -Striving for that Perfect Medium
As NLRB Trial Examiner Henry S. Sahm has explained, the general statement of an evaluation based on a "observation of the witnesses" has been held insufficient:
It is often quite difficult, if not impossible in some instances, to describe by the written word the impressions derived from observing a witness testify. Impressions are extremely difficult to imprison within any form of words. Not only would it not serve any useful purpose but it would unduly prolong and add nothing to a decision to describe a witness as having a furtive look, a nervous twitch, a flushed face or perspiring freely. Those indicia are better left unsaid in the hope that judgment as to such matters should be left to the sense and experience of the one who observed the witnesses, guided, of course, by acceptable standards.
However, the Labor Board in two recent cases, Allied Chain Link Fence Co., 126 NLRB No. 74 and Buckley Development Co., 126 NLRB No. 147 , indicates that examiners must, in the future, spell out in detail, the indicia upon which they believe one witness as against another. In both those cases the Board reversed the examiners' credibility resolutions because they did not rest their evaluation of the witnesses' credibility on "demeanor." Both examiners merely prefaced their conclusions by stating that they based their credibility findings on their "observation of the witnesses." Evidently, this is not sufficient. It would appear that in evaluating a witness' testimony in terms of demeanor evidence, the Board will require examiners to delineate specifically the impressions derived from observing the witness testify. Claims, 1996 WL 374186 , at *4 (stating that credibility determinations cannot be based on intangible or intuitive reasons; rather they 'must be grounded in the evidence and articulated in the determination or decision '); see also Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 391 (lOth Cir. 1995 ) (stating that a credibility determination 'should be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings') (quotation omitted)") (some citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Yet a judge who specifically and irrationally relies on a physical trait is likely to be reversed:
Without doubt, the result of our procedure is to vest the trial judge with immense power not subject to correction even if misused: His estimate of an orally testifying witness' credibility may stem from the trial judge's application of an absurd rule-of-thumb, such as that when a witness wipes his hands during his testimony, unquestionably he is lying; but, unless the judge reveals of record that he used such an irrational test of credibility, an upper court can do nothing to correct his error. Corp., 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949) .
Broadcast Music v. Havana Madrid Restaurant
No doubt for these reasons Chief ALJ Timony of the FTC advises the description of demeanor evidence determinations as "behavioral conclusions" (e.g., "'recalcitrance and obvious reluctance' to answer questions, 'sudden lapse[s] of memory,' or 'hesitant and noncommital,'" frank, sincere, or straightforward, rather than "physical descriptions" (e.g., twitching, stuttering, sweating, or blinking"). James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility (Witness Truth-Telling), 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 906, 928 (2000) .
Butera v. Apfel, 173 F.3d 1049 173 F.3d , 1055 173 F.3d -56 (7th Cir. 1996 ) provides a good example of an ALl's persuasive reasoning regarding testimonial (and derivative, based on character) inferences:
While the ALJ found that Butera experienced some pain that would prevent him from performing heavier work, he specifically detailed a number of reasons for disbelieving Butera's description of the degree of functional limitation he was experiencing: (1) Butera was vague and evasive in answering questions; (2) Butera was hesitant and indefinite in describing the character, severity, and location of his pain; and (3) Butera declined, for reasons unknown, to volunteer any information about his work history, forcing the ALJ to ask detailed questions which revealed that Butera had been imprisoned on a burglary conviction and had been assessed interest and penalties for income tax evasion. The ALl's credibility determination of Butera, based on these three factors, is precisely the sort of determination that this Court has recognized is entitled to particular deference as it "involve[ s] intangible and unarticulable elements which impress the ALJ, that, unfortunately leave 'no trace that can be discerned in this or any other transcript." [W] e are of the opinion that the ALJ reasonably determined that the evidence as a whole did not lend credibility to Butera's assertion that he was "disabled" and completely unable to work as a result of back and leg pain.
4.
Example: How to Credit Absence of Records: Negative Evidence v. Affirmative Evidence?
Cf Armstead v. US Dept. of HUD, 815 F.2d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 1987 ) (over dissent of 1. Hunter) ("After declining her request to accept an assignment of her mortgage, the Department of Housing and Urban Development told plaintiff that she could have a face-to-face conference with an agency official if she telephoned for an appointment. In an affidavit plaintiff stated that she did call the agency, but was dissuaded from further action by the unidentified [female] who answered the phone. Relying on the fact that its records contain no notation of the call [though its employees are supposed to make such records, but not having canvassed its female employees reachable at that telephone number], the agency refused a renewed request for a conference. We conclude that by failing to credit the plaintiffs uncontradicted affidavit in denying this de minimis accommodation, the agency action was arbitrary and capricious.").
VI. Effect of New Technology
Given the research concluding that auditory cues are more reliable than visual, do audiotaped records give the reviewing agency or court as much insight as the ALJ?
Judge Frank, in a "1984"-type reference in 1949, supra page 7, said, "Only were we to have 'talking movies' of trials would" a '''rehearing court'" be a "'reseeing court. '" Do videotechnological advances make that available? See James P. Court of Appeals) ("The AJ's twenty-page opinion reflects a three-day hearing and extensive consideration and discussion of disputed issues that the AJ resolved in large measure based on his assessment of the credibility and demeanor of the various witnesses who testified," The ALJ found the agent to have an "extraordinarily" fine reputation for honesty, integrity, and devotion to duty; and that, based on the confidential informant's demeanor, his testimony supporting the agent was "honest and credible." '''When ... the AJ's finding is explicitly or implicitly based on the demeanor of a witness, the board may not simply disagree with the AJ's assessment of credibility .... If the board reverses such a finding, we will not sustain its decision on appeal unless the board has articulated sound reasons, based on the record, for its contrary evaluation of the testimonial evidence. '" Such sound reasons were lacking here. "When the demeanor-based deference requirement is not in play, the MSPB is free to re-weigh the evidence and substitute its own decision as to the facts or the law commensurate with the substantial evidence standard, but it cannot substitute its judgment on issues of credibility based on the demeanor of witnesses.").
• DantJ 'an, Inc. v Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,545 (6th Cir. 1986 ) (en banc). This is especially so since the Appeals Council's findings conflict with the findings of an ALJ who has been intimately involved with a case.").
• Aylett v. ."') ("heightened scrutiny" ofthe agency's decision applies when it has rejected, rather than affirmed, an ALJ's assessment of witness credibility").
• Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074 (9th Cir. 1977 ) (ALJ ~ rev'd by NLRB ~ NLRB rev'd by Court of Appeals) (Board had based its decision solely on testimony that had been discredited -here "by clear implication" -by the ALJ who "believed Zamora, whom he characterized 'as an honest and forthright witness,' and disbelieved Ruiz, whose testimony he characterized as 'equivocal'" and described Rios as having "fabricated facts" and as having demonstrated "animosity toward Zamora" during his testimony; the Board's special expertise in labor-management relations gave it no upper hand on this question of testimonial inferences).
• bathing, emotional, discipline, etc." because her husband worked six days a week, usually from early in the morning until 10 p.m. In the same questionnaire, she also stated that she left the house "daily" to go to places such as her son's school, taekwondo lessons and soccer games, doctor's appointments, and the grocery store. It is true that Rollins' testimony was somewhat equivocal about how regularly she was able to keep up with all of these activities, and the ALJ's interpretation of her testimony may not be the only reasonable one. But it is still a reasonable interpretation and is supported by substantial evidence; thus, it is not our role to second-guess it.")
• Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145 (8th Cir. 2001) (ALJ affd denial of disability benefits; district court aff d -court of appeals afr d) (ALJ articulated sufficient specific reasons, both testimonial and derivative, to reject claimant's and treating physician'S testimony).
• NLRB v. Beverly Enters. -Mass., Inc., 174 F.3d 13,26 (1st Cir. 1999 ) (ALJ found violations ofNLRA -NLRB agreed with AU -Court of Appeals atrd) (ALJ's "implicit" resolution of credibility disputes meant that evidence cited by employer was not "uncontradicted").
• Smith admitted that his memory of the June 13 meeting was 'not good,' and although he needed to refresh his recollection before testifying, his testimony was neither incredible nor did it become so simply because he was not completely certain of every detail of the meeting. Because Perdue has failed to demonstrate 'extraordinary circumstances,' we decline to overturn the ALJ's decision to credit Smith's testimony.") (citations omitted).
• Ostronski v. Chater, 94 F.3d 413 (8th Cir. 1996) (ALJ found disability benefits were properly denied by SSA ~ Appeals Council remanded ~after 2nd hearing, ALJ again held denial proper ~ district court aff d ~ court of appeals aff d) (ALJ had sufficient (derivative) reasons for discrediting claimant's physician's medical opinions; "The AU [also] properly considered the [lay] witness testimony and refused to place controlling weight on it for acceptable reasons. The ALJ noted that Ostronski's mother, sister, and husband were not qualified to render an opinion as to Ostronski's capacity to work; their statements merely corroborated Ostronski's testimony regarding her activities; and the testimony conflicted with the medical evidence regarding Ostronski's functional capabilities. Thus, the ALJ had a solid basis for discounting Ostronski's lay witness testimony. In these circumstances, the AU was not required to make credibility findings as to these witnesses in order to decide their testimony was not entitled to great weight.").
• Cross Mountain Coal, Inc. v. Ward, 93 F.3d 211 (6th Cir. 1996 ) (ALJ awarded black lung benefits to claimant ~ Benefits Review Board afT' d ~ Court of Appeals afT'd) ("In deciding whether the substantial evidence requirement is satisfied, we consider whether the ALJ adequately explained the reasons for crediting certain testimony and evidence over other evidence in the record in deciding to either award or deny benefits. See Director, OWCP v. Congleton, 743 F.2d 428, 430 (6th Cir. 1984) . Finally, when dealing with a claim for benefits, we must keep in mind that the Act is remedial in nature and must be liberally construed "to include the largest number of miners as benefit recipients. " Tussey v. Island Creek Coal Co., 982 F.2d 1036 , 1042 (6th Cir. 1993 .").
• NLRB v. Lakepark Indus., Inc., 919 F.2d 42 (6th Cir. 1990 ) (ALl found violations-" Board adopted ALl's report, with modifications -.. court of appeals affd) (the AU's "credibility findings are consistent with a reasonable reading of the record").
• NLRB v. Dinion Coil Co., 201 F.2d 484 (2d Cir. 1952 ) (unfair labor practice: firing employees because they were union members) (hearing examiner -.. NLRB agreed -.. Court of Appeals affd) (Trial Examiner had stated in his report: '''On the entire record, including his observation of the witnesses, the undersigned is not persuaded that
[employee] was discharged by the [employer] for the reasons advanced by it. '" * * * "These facts constitute a sufficient foundation for a rational inference that [the employee's] union activity induced the discharge.").
VIII. Examples of Cases Where ALJ's Findings Were Ultimately Rejected
A.
Where ALJ Relied on Demeanor Evidence
• Be-La Stores v. NLRB, 126 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 1997) (over 1. Ervin's dissent) (AU found some alleged NLRA violations existed and others did not, and issued a mandatory bargaining order (rather than an election) -.. Board both affirmed and reversed some of ALl's findings of violations but affirmed bargaining order -.. court of appeals rev'd) (ALJ explained, in a "perfunctory footnote," that he "credited" all of the Union's 37 witnesses over all 43 of the employer's witnesses; "Where an ALl provides no more than a generalized, conclusory statement purportedly incorporating a host of individual comparative credibility determinations with respect to multiple witnesses, we refuse to indulge the presumption that its findings are entitled to the ordinary deference. Cf Burlington Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 680 F.2d 974, 977 (4th Cir. 1982 ) ("We are not however, required to accept [the] AU's credibility determinations where they are not supported by substantial evidence."). Otherwise, savvy ALJ's could simply ground their judgments in broad, categorical statements that they credit all of one party's witnesses, and thereby effectively insulate their decisions from meaningful judicial review.").
• NLRB v. New York-Keansburg-Long Branch Bus Co., 578 F.2d 472,477-78 (3d Cir. 1978 ) (ALl found violations of NLRA -.. Board summarily aff d -.. Court of Appeals denied Board's petition for enforcement) ("The ALJ made his findings and reached his conclusions by relying almost exclusively on the testimonial, as distinct from the documentary, evidence presented by certain Union representatives. Even if the AU had properly credited this testimony, which we believe he did not, we would still find that: the inferences on which (his) findings were based were so overborne by evidence calling for contrary inferences that the findings of the (ALJ) could not, on
